AV | This week in Cybersecurity
- Glen Armes
- Jan 26
- 4 min read
2026 Week 5

This week’s signal is a human and identity driven intrusion pattern (vishing + SSO session theft) with platform-native trust abuse (Teams brand impersonation, Zendesk ticket spam) and software supply-chain bypasses (npm Git dependencies, malicious VS Code extensions). The result is a measurable increase in Credential Compromise / Session Hijack risk (↑) and Developer Toolchain exposure (↑), while patch-driven exploitation continues to accelerate for edge and infrastructure platforms (Cisco UC/Webex zero-day; VMware vCenter RCE in KEV; FortiGate patch bypass).
Operational Technology (OT) security gets a material policy-level lift: CISA + UK NCSC + FBI published Operational Technology (OT) secure connectivity principles that can drive programmatic reduction in exploitability (↓) when adopted. Meanwhile, CISA’s PQC product categories push long-horizon crypto agility planning forward and this is important for insurers/financial services that retain data for long periods
Key Signals & What Changed
SSO + MFA bypass pressure increases (↑): adaptable vishing kits synchronize victim flows to defeat non-phishing-resistant MFA; ShinyHunters claims involvement in SSO-related data theft.
Enterprise comms “trust surface” hardening begins (↓): Teams rolling out brand impersonation warnings by default (targeted release).
Security tooling adds anti-phishing guardrails (↓): 1Password introduces URL-mismatch warnings (autofill + paste protections).
Supply chain & dev ecosystem pressure persists (↑): npm defenses can be bypassed via Git dependencies; malicious VS Code “AI assistant” extensions exfiltrate developer data at scale.
Patch bypass / known exploitation continues (↑): VMware vCenter RCE flagged as actively exploited; FortiGate “patched but still getting hacked” pattern expands blast radius.
Threat Activity Highlights (what mattered most)
Identity-first intrusions (vishing + SSO/session theft): attackers use real-time phone social engineering + dynamic phishing flows to capture credentials and/or session tokens, enabling rapid lateral movement into SaaS and enterprise apps.
Dev and build pipeline targeting: malicious IDE extensions and npm bypass paths increase odds of code/IP theft and downstream supply-chain compromise.
Infrastructure exploitation velocity: actively exploited enterprise vulnerabilities (Cisco UC/Webex; VMware vCenter; Fortinet bypass) reinforce “patch + validate + monitor” as a weekly cadence, not a quarterly motion.
Trust-abuse spam and impersonation: Zendesk ticket spam waves and brand impersonation calls highlight growing abuse of legitimate platforms for scale.
Critical Vulnerabilities & Exploitation Watchlist (prioritize this week)
Actively exploited / urgent
Cisco Unified Communications / Webex Calling - CVE-2026-20045 (RCE; exploited as zero-day).
VMware vCenter Server - CVE-2024-37079 (RCE; now in KEV / actively exploited).
Fortinet FortiGate - CVE-2025-59718 (auth bypass; reports of patch bypass / continued exploitation).
High-impact / rapid weaponization risk
Telnet injection path - (reported large exposed surface; exploitation observed quickly after disclosure/patch).
WordPress ACF Extended - CVE-2025-14533 (admin/priv-esc style site takeover risk) Why is anyone still using WordPress?.
CISA exploitation advisory (multi-product) - exploitation confirmed across multiple enterprise software components (treat as “verify exposure now”).
Recommended Actions This Week (do-now checklist)
Identity / SSO: enforce phishing-resistant MFA (passkeys/FIDO2) for privileged and high-value SaaS; tighten Okta network zones / tenant allowlists; disable legacy auth where possible.
Comms trust controls: prepare Teams helpdesk playbooks for impersonation warnings; add end-user “verify-before-comply” scripts for inbound calls.
DevSecOps hardening: block unapproved IDE extensions; enforce signed extensions where possible; restrict npm Git dependencies and add pipeline policy checks.
Exploit mitigation: patch Cisco/VMware/Fortinet urgently; add detection for suspicious admin creation / config exports on firewalls.
OT programs: apply the OT secure connectivity principles as design requirements for any new integrations and remote access.
FAIR QuickQuant (12-month annualized)
Scenario A - Vishing defeats non-phishing-resistant MFA → Okta SSO takeover (↑)
Threat Actor / Method: organized fraud / extortion crews using real-time vishing + dynamic phishing kits
Asset: Okta tenant / SSO session tokens and admin workflows
Effect: unauthorized access to SaaS apps + data exfil + potential extortion
Loss Event Frequency (LEF) (annual): 0.5 – 2.0 / year
Loss Magnitude (LM) (per event): $750k – $6.0M
Annualized Loss Exposure (ALE): $375k – $12.0M / year
Scenario B - FortiGate auth bypass / patch-bypass → rogue admin + config exfil (↑)
Threat Actor / Method: automated exploitation + persistence account creation
Asset: perimeter firewall, VPN config, segmentation rules
Effect: persistent access, lateral movement enablement, partner risk
LEF (annual): 0.25 – 1.0 / year
Loss Magnitude (per event): $500k – $8.0M
Annualized Loss Exposure: $125k – $8.0M / year
Scenario C - Malicious VS Code extension → source/IP exfil + downstream compromise (↑)
Threat Actor / Method: trojanized “AI assistant” extension siphoning code/credentials
Asset: developer endpoints + repositories + build secrets
Effect: IP loss, credential theft, supply-chain exposure
LEF (annual): 0.25 – 1.5 / year
Loss Magnitude (per event): $300k – $5.0M
Annualized Loss Exposure: $75k – $7.5M / year
FAIR-CAM Control Mapping (controls that reduce this week’s threats)
Avoidance (↓)
Reduce exposed attack paths: disable unnecessary remote admin paths; restrict Telnet/legacy services; remove unsupported auth flows.
Deterrence (↓)
Strong account recovery & impersonation friction: Teams impersonation warnings + reporting; publicized enforcement + rapid suspension for abuse.
Resistance (↓)
Phishing-resistant MFA/passkeys; device-bound session protections; conditional access; extension allowlisting; package policy gates.
Responsive (↓)
Detect rogue admin creation / config exports; IR playbooks for SSO compromise; rapid credential rotation; tenant lockdown procedures.
Sector Notes (high-level)
Insurance/FinServ: identity compromise + long data retention makes PQC planning strategically relevant (→ now, ↓ later).
OT operators / critical infrastructure: connectivity principles provide a blueprint to reduce systemic exposure (↓ if adopted).
Software orgs: dev ecosystem risks remain one of the highest ROI areas for control investment (↑).
Metrics to Track (weekly)
% privileged accounts on phishing-resistant MFA
SaaS session/token theft alerts + time-to-contain
blocked/unapproved extensions and packages
Patch SLA for KEV / exploited vulns
Executive Decisions / Investment Signals
Fund identity hardening controls (passkeys/FIDO2 + conditional access) as a top-line risk reducer.
Expand dev toolchain governance (extension policy + supply chain gates).
Treat “patched-but-exploited” edge systems as assumed-breach and invest in continuous validation + monitoring.




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